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Abstract 
It is well established that directing goal-driven attention to a particular stimulus property (e.g. 
red), or a conceptual category (e.g. toys) can induce powerful involuntary capture by goal-
matching stimuli. Here we tested whether broad affective search goals (e.g. for anything 
threat-related) could similarly induce a generalised capture to an entire matching affective 
category. Across four experiments, participants were instructed to search for threat-related 
images in a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) stream, while ignoring threat-related 
distractors presented in task-irrelevant locations. Across these experiments we found no 
evidence of goal-driven attentional capture by threat distractors when participants adopted a 
general ‘threat detection’ goal encompassing multiple sub-categories of threat (Experiments 
1a, 1b). This was true even when there was partial overlap between the threat distractors and 
the search goal (i.e. subset of the targets matched the distractor; Experiment 2). However, 
when participants adopted a more specific goal for a single sub-category of threat (e.g. fearful 
faces), robust goal-driven capture occurred by distractors matching this sub-category 
(Experiment 3). These findings suggest that while affective criteria can be used in the 
guidance of attention, attentional settings based on affective properties alone may not induce 
goal-driven attentional capture. We discuss implications for recent goal-driven accounts of 
affective attentional biases.  
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 In daily life we are presented with an overwhelming amount of information, of which 
only a small proportion is selected for further processing.  Over many decades of selective 
attention research, a rich literature has characterised this selection process as reflecting an 
interplay between top-down goals (i.e. what a person wishes to attend to) and stimulus-driven 
factors (e.g. the sensory properties of a particular object, such as brightness). Conventionally, 
stimulus-driven factors have been considered to underlie involuntary attentional capture 
effects, while goal-driven attention has often, historically, been conceptualised as a 
completely voluntary mechanism (e.g. Theeuwes, 2010; 2018). However, converging lines of 
evidence increasingly imply that goal-driven mechanisms (i.e. those initiated in response to a 
goal) may also play an important, if seemingly paradoxical, role in involuntary attention 
(Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1992).  
First, it is now well-established that asking participants to adopt particular voluntary 
goals can lead to powerful involuntary attentional capture by goal-matching stimuli – a 
phenomenon often referred to as contingent capture (e.g. Folk et al., 1992; Folk, Remington 
& Wright, 1994; Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998; Leber & Egeth, 2006). 
Contingent capture effects do not appear limited to simple features (e.g., colour) - similar 
capture effects have been observed when search goals are defined by a conceptual category. 
For example, instructing participants to monitor a centrally presented rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) stream for images drawn from a particular category (e.g. toys) resulted 
in attentional capture by category-matching distractors (e.g. rocking horse, Lego blocks, 
teddy bear, Slinky), even when these appeared in a peripheral task-irrelevant location 
(Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013).   
Contingent capture has often been discussed with respect to its important implications 
for experimental situations (e.g. the possibility that seemingly stimulus-driven effects could 
alternatively result from goal-driven strategies, Folk et al., 1992; Bacon & Egeth, 1994; 
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Gibson & Kelsey, 1998). However, these large and consistent goal-driven effects on 
involuntary attention are presumably also influential outside the laboratory. While attentional 
goals are typically imposed by the experimenter in laboratory settings, outside the laboratory 
goals may be freely chosen on the basis of motivational factors such as current concerns, 
mood, and desired outcomes (Dijkterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Klinger, 2013). As such, an 
interesting question is whether involuntary attentional capture is commonly inadvertently 
activated for motivationally relevant stimuli (i.e. categories of stimuli that one might 
commonly adopt an attentional goal for).  For instance, if we generally wish to be alert to 
potential threats in order to avoid putting ourselves in danger, does this lead to involuntary 
capture by all threat-related stimuli (including those that we may wish to ignore, e.g. violent 
newspaper headlines)?  
 Consistent with this suggestion, the ability of threat-related stimuli to – at least in 
certain situations - involuntarily capture attention has been widely studied (see Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009; Carretie, 2014, for meta-analysis and reviews). 
Interestingly, this attentional bias appears to be most pronounced in individuals with high 
levels of anxiety - indeed Bar-Haim and colleagues’ large-scale meta-analysis across 172 
studies found that the effect was absent in low anxious individuals who might arguably be 
less motivated to attend to potential threats. Moreover, a growing line of research within the 
attention and emotion literature has highlighted that the rapid allocation of attention to threat 
related stimuli, across individuals, is not unconditional as was often posited in early models. 
Traditionally, the automatic prioritisation of threat was viewed as reflecting a hard-wired and 
inflexible stimulus-driven mechanism (e.g. Öhman, 1992). However, this view has been 
challenged by recent evidence that the current relevance of threat-related stimuli to a task 
moderates the attentional capture by task-irrelevant affective stimuli (Everaert, Spruyt & De 
Houwer, 2013; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez & Van Damme, 2013; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik 
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& Safadi, 2012). Specifically, attention to threat has been found to be heightened when the 
threat is relevant to the performance of a task, either because it appears in a target location, 
participants have to explicitly respond to the threat-related stimulus, or it resembles a threat-
related target. Conversely, when the threat-related stimulus is unrelated to the performance of 
a task, attention to these stimuli is often attenuated or abolished completely (although see 
Grimshaw, Kranz, Carmel, Moody & Devue, 2018).  
For instance, Lichtenstein-Vidne et al. (2012) found that threat-related distractors 
captured attention only when the target was also threat-related and not when it was neutral 
(see also, Vromen, Lipp, Remington & Becker, 2016). Similarly, when performing a task 
with both affective (e.g. fearful faces) and neutral targets (e.g. buildings), the processing of 
the affective target only interferes with identification of a subsequent neutral target when 
participants judge the affective content of the first stimulus; this interference with subsequent 
responding is absent if participants have to judge the same images on non-affective features 
such as gender (e.g. Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel & Schneider, 2009). Based on such 
evidence, Feature-Specific attention allocation theory (cf. Everaert et al., 2013) has suggested 
that attention to emotional stimuli only influences cognition when the emotional features are 
task-relevant, and that the affective content of a stimulus captures attention because 
participants are more likely to find it relevant to their aims. Manipulations of task-relevance 
could be viewed as indirect manipulations of top-down search goals – for example, if 
participants notice that targets are always threat-related, they may be more likely to adopt a 
goal for threat even if this was not directly instructed, potentially inducing contingent capture 
effects. Recently, we have built on this growing line of research on task-relevance using 
direct manipulations of search goals. Adapting the contingent capture paradigm of Wyble and 
colleagues (2013), we have demonstrated that involuntary attentional capture effects for 
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certain categories1 of motivationally-relevant stimuli such as threatening animals, emotional 
faces, alcohol, and rewarding and aversive smoking cues can be experimentally induced 
when participants are asked to adopt a search goal for these categories. Such findings raise 
the possibility that the phenomenon of involuntary attentional capture by threat might 
conceivably reflect a goal-driven mechanism (Brown, Berggren & Forster, in press; Brown, 
Duka & Forster, 2018a; Brown, Forster & Duka, 2018b).  
Given that it may often be adaptive to voluntarily look out for multiple potential 
dangers, a goal-driven account of attentional capture by threat appears plausible. For 
instance, when walking home late at night, we might act to protect our own safety by looking 
out for broken glass on the floor, a speeding taxi, or a stranger lurking in the shadows. 
Indeed, the idea that attentional biases towards threat may be due to an intentional vigilance 
has been raised in early models of anxiety (e.g. Well & Mathews, 1994). We note, however, 
that our previous demonstrations of goal-driven capture by motivationally relevant stimuli 
have been limited to single conceptual categories (e.g. threatening animals or negative 
smoking images; Brown et al., in press; 2018b). One question which remains, therefore, is 
whether or not goal-driven attentional capture can be elicited in response to a general 
affective goal (e.g. threat detection), and generalise across multiple sub-categories of threat 
(e.g. threatening objects, threat-related vehicles, and threat-related faces). On one hand, one 
might speculate that the general affective category of ‘threat’ is sufficiently well learned to 
                                                          
1 Here we use the term 'category' simply to refer to a class of stimuli with particular shared 
characteristics. These shared characteristics may include perceptual features but may also be 
based on other properties such as conceptual or semantic associations (see Wyble et al., 
2013). Following Cunningham and Wolfe (2014), we do not predict differences in visual 
search for superordinate versus subordinate category levels. 
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serve as a top-down attentional setting and induce goal-driven capture. Given that a wide 
range of different classes of threat stimuli produce similar patterns of attentional capture and 
overlapping neural activation (e.g. the amygdala; Bishop, 2007; Sander, Graffman & Zalla, 
2003; Öhman, 2005), it is plausible that affective categories can be represented as a 
sufficiently cohesive category to act as a top-down goal. Further, there is evidence that when 
individuals learn an arbitrary category of abstract stimuli (i.e. novel shapes), pairing of an 
aversive outcome with a subset of exemplars leads to an automatic fear response (i.e. 
galvanic skin response, aversive outcome expectancy) to all exemplars, despite being visually 
dissimilar, suggesting that affective categories can exist beyond visual similarity or rigid 
conceptual relations (Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett & Baeyens, 2014). Other research using 
non-affective stimuli indicates that well-learned but perceptually diverse categories can 
produce involuntary goal-driven attentional capture: Giammarco and colleagues 
demonstrated that after training participants to learn arbitrary categories of visually dissimilar 
everyday objects, instructions to search for this novel category resulted in attentional capture 
by task-irrelevant stimuli from this learnt category (Giammarco, Paoletti, Guild & Al-
Aidroos, 2016). Thus, these two independent lines of evidence suggest that individuals are 
capable of learning visually heterogeneous affective categories independent of visual 
features, and that well-learned yet visually heterogeneous categories can elicit goal-driven 
attentional capture. Combined, this evidence supports the hypothesis that purely affective 
categories could produce involuntary goal-driven attentional capture. 
On the other hand, one of our recent investigations found that although searching for 
threatening animal targets produced goal-driven capture by threatening animal distractors, 
this effect did not generalise to another form of threat - fearful faces did not capture attention 
during search for threatening animals (Brown et al., in press). This could suggest an 
important limitation to the ability of purely affective categories to capture attention, which 
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would have key implications for both understanding attentional capture by threat and 
predicting the extent of goal-driven influences on involuntary attention in daily life. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that our instructed search goal for the single sub-category of 
threatening animals was more specific than might be observed in many real-world contexts, 
and hence elicited a narrower form of goal-driven attentional capture. The current study, 
therefore, aims to provide a direct test of the possibility that adopting a general attentional 
goal for the category of ‘threat’ can induce attentional capture by all threat stimuli, regardless 
of their subordinate category.  
To this end, we used the same RSVP contingent capture task as in our previous 
investigation measuring goal-driven capture by threat (Brown et al., in press); however, 
instead of instructing participants to detect a target from a specific threat category (i.e. 
dangerous animals), we asked them to adopt a threat-detection search goal, defined as 
searching for “anything which could cause or show pain, death, or signal danger”. For the 
comparative non-threat search goal condition, we asked participants to adopt a positive 
search goal, defined as searching for “anything which makes people happy or portrays 
positive emotion”. We predicted that when participants searched for the general category of 
threat-related stimuli in the central stream, peripheral or parafoveal task-irrelevant threat-
related distractors, not part of the target set, would capture attention more than a neutral 
category of distractor. However, when participants are searching for the general positive 
category, we predicted that this difference should be eliminated.   
Experiment 1a and 1b 
Methods 
Experiment 1a and 1b used near identical methods with only a minor variation in the 
size and position of stimuli: For Experiment 1a distractor images were larger and appeared in 
peripheral locations of the visual field; whilst in Experiment 1b distractor images were 
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resized so as to appear in parafoveal locations of the visual field, in line with previous 
investigations which have found conceptual generalisation of contingent capture (Wyble et 
al., 2013).  
Participants.  
Experiment 1a. 29 participants were initially recruited from the subject pool at 
Birkbeck University of London, though two participants were excluded prior to analysis for 
accuracy being 2 SDs below the group mean (M = 61.78%, SD = 15.05), thus participants 
who scored below 31% accuracy were excluded. Our stopping rule was based on the 
maximum number of participants that could be recruited within one week. To estimate power 
to detect goal-driven effects, we identified five papers in which task-irrelevant categorical 
distractors captured attention in an RSVP task due to congruence with the search goal (Brown 
et al., 2018a; 2018b; in press; Giammarco et al., 2016; Wyble et al., 2013).  The average 
effect size for the difference between target identification/ detection accuracy when a 
distractor category overlapped with the search goal versus when it was incongruent, was dz = 
1.04 (SD = .52; k = 19). A power analysis using G*power software revealed that a sample of 
10 participants would be suitable to detect this average effect (α = .05, β = .80; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Thus, our final sample size should be highly powered to 
detect distraction by conceptually overlapping distractors. The final sample consisted of 17 
females and 10 males, the mean age of which was 25.48 (SD = 6.87).  Participants were 
remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.  
Participants across all experiments completed an informed consent procedure prior to 
participating in the study. All methods reported were in accordance with the declaration of 
Helsinki, and were approved beforehand by either the Birkbeck Psychological Sciences 
Ethics Committee (Experiment 1a), or the University of Sussex Science and Technology 
Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (Experiments 1b, 2 and 3). 
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Experiment 1b. To ensure sensitivity to interpret null effects, the sample size for this 
second experiment was determined through a Bayesian stopping rule. We therefore stopped 
collecting data once the Bayes factor comparing evidence for goal-driven attentional capture 
(i.e. the difference in accuracy between the neutral distractor and the threat distractor in the 
threat search condition) was either above or below the selected cut-off for a substantial 
evidence for either the experimental or null hypothesis. A factor above 3 shows evidence 
favouring the experimental hypothesis, whilst a factor below .33 shows evidence favouring 
the null (Dienes, 2008; 2016).2  
An initial sample of 21 participants was recruited over the final few weeks of the 
academic term, from the subject pool at the University of Sussex. Of this initial sample, 5 
participants were excluded for scoring below the 31% accuracy cut-off which we retained 
from Experiment 1a. The Bayesian stopping criterion was checked for the first time after the 
end of term and following these exclusions, which revealed that the key comparison reached 
sensitivity (B < .33), thus we did not require further data to draw a conclusion. Our final 
sample consisted of 12 female and 4 male participants, the mean age of whom was 20.94 (SD 
                                                          
2 A Bayesian stopping rule does not require an a priori sample size due to the Bayes factor 
being generated from the collected data. Once the Bayes factor has become sensitive (i.e. B < 
.33; B > 3) it suggests that the effect is consistent enough to provide strong evidence for 
either the null or the experimental hypothesis, and data collection can be halted. Variable or 
inconsistent data can result in non-significance despite a real effect being present in the data; 
a Bayes factor is sensitive to this variability (i.e. SE of difference) and will only favour the 
null or experimental hypothesis if the difference between conditions, or the absence of a 
difference, is sufficiently consistent.  Until evidence strongly favours either hypothesis, more 
data must be collected (cf. Dienes, 2016; see Bayesian analysis section below). 
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= 3.36). The full analysis of this data (including any calculation of p-values) was conducted 
only when the final sample had been collected. A power analysis using G*power software 
revealed that our final sample had the power of β = .80 to detect a pairwise effect of dz = .75 
or above (α = .05; Faul et al., 2007). 
Stimuli. The stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 software on a 24-inch Dell 
monitor with a screen resolution of 1920×1080 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz in Experiment 1a, 
and a 16-inch Dell monitor with a screen resolution of 800×600 and refresh rate of 60 Hz in 
Experiment 1b.  The experiment was conducted in a dimly lit room.  In total there were nine 
positive targets and nine threat-related targets, each made up of equal numbers of objects, 
animals, and faces: three in each category. The images were selected to be in line with the 
definitions of threat-related targets (i.e. “anything which could cause or show pain, death, or 
signal danger”) or positive-related targets (i.e. “anything which makes people happy or 
portrays positive emotion”) given to the participants. The threat-related stimuli were selected 
based on their association with threat outcomes, as recent research has revealed that the 
Pavlovian association with threat is sufficient to capture attention (e.g. Schmidt, Belopolsky 
& Theeuwes, 2015). 
The animal images were all sourced from a previous investigation by Brown et al. (in 
press). The threat-related animals selected for targets were a snake, a spider, and an attacking 
dog (this final image was sourced from the International Affective Picture System database, 
IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997. The positive animals included a kitten, a puppy, and 
a duckling. Previous ratings from Brown et al. (in press) confirmed that the threatening 
animals were considered moderately to highly arousing and were rated as having a negative 
valence, and positive animals were moderately to highly arousing and were rated as having a 
positive valence. 
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The object images were taken from the IAPS image database or sourced from Google 
images. The threat-related images included a gun, a knife, and a syringe. The knife and the 
syringe were sourced from online due to them having better visual quality compared to the 
IAPS images of the same objects. The positive images were all sourced from Google images 
and were based on general positive categories. We sourced three images including a bunch of 
flowers, money in pounds, and a gift wrapped present. 
The final subcategory of target stimuli were emotional faces, all these stimuli were 
sourced from the NimStim database which have previously been used in experiments which 
found attentional capture by emotional faces (Tottenham et al., 2009). The identities of the 
faces were the same for both happy and fearful targets, meaning that they only differed in 
their emotional content. These identities included two male faces and one female face. As in 
previous investigations which found attentional capture by emotional faces we ovalled these 
faces to remove non-emotional identifying features (i.e. hair and jawline).   
The internal contexts (i.e. cues within the image) of potentially ambiguous stimuli 
were selected to favour the threat-related interpretations; all animals appeared in attack 
positions (e.g. bared teeth), as did objects (e.g. knife held in clenched fist). Additionally, the 
positive images were also selected to be unambiguously and universally positive; for 
instance, the objects and animals did not require extensive personal history of positive 
association (e.g. cigarettes in smokers). 
All images taken from established image sets (i.e. IAPS) were previously rated on 
arousal and negative valence ratings. In line with previous investigations, threat-related 
images were selected if they had moderate to high arousal ratings and high negative valence 
ratings (e.g. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2004; Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, 
Van Damme & Crombez, 2008). Stimuli not from image sets were selected based on their 
similarity to those in the set (see Most et al. (2005) for similar procedure). 
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The neutral filler images presented in the task were also objects, animals, and faces. 
The neutral faces were an equal split of male and female faces, and were composed of a 
mixture of different ethnicities. In total there were 48 neutral faces which were sourced from 
both the NimStim image database (Tottenham et al., 2009) and the Productive Aging 
Laboratory Face database (Minear & Park, 2004). The neutral objects selected were everyday 
household items, such as shoes, bicycles, or furniture. There were a total of 48 of these 
neutral objects which were sourced from the IAPS image database (Lang et al., 1997). The 
neutral animal images were sourced from Brown et al. (in press) and were selected based on 
their affective ratings being neither threatening nor cute. The chosen exemplars consisted of 
animals such as fish, cows, pigs, and camels. All unlicensed images are listed online via the 
Open Science Framework (osf.io/ju87s). All target and filler images were presented in the 
centre of the screen and measured 6°×4.02° in Experiment 1a and 3.44°×2.29° in Experiment 
1b, at a viewing distance of 59cm maintained using a chin-rest. 
The distractor images measured 8.09°×5.35° in Experiment 1a and 4.58×2.98° in 
Experiment 1b. In both experiments, distractors appeared both above and below the central 
RSVP stream with a gap of .5° separation from the central image. The positive distractors 
consisted of nine images depicting people celebrating a marriage or sporting victory, or 
children playing. The threat-related distractors consisted of nine images of people who were 
fatally wounded or mutilated, such as those in a murder scene or a car accident. These 
affective images were all sourced from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 1997). These exact 
threat related images have been found to capture attention in similar RSVP tasks (e.g. Most et 
al., 2005; Kennedy & Most, 2015). The neutral distractor images consisted of 24 different 
scenes of people doing everyday activities (e.g. people shopping, at work, or on public 
transport). Twelve of these were sourced from the IAPS images set (Lang et al., 1997) and 12 
from Google images, those taken from online were selected based on their similarity to the 
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neutral images taken from the IAPS database, that is, they included different images of the 
same content. Therefore, all distractor images depicted scenes consisting of individuals or 
groups, though with different affective associations. 
Procedure. See Figure 1 for an example trial sequence in the experimental paradigm.  
In each block of the search task participants were given the instruction to search an RSVP 
stream for either a general positive category (“anything which makes people happy or 
portrays positive emotion”) or threat-related category (“anything which could cause or show 
pain, death, or signal danger”. Text search goal cues (i.e. “Positive”, “Threat”) were also 
presented at the beginning of each trial for 400ms. The single target stimulus was presented 
in a nine frame RSVP stream consisting of eight other neutral stimuli which were randomly 
selected from the total pool of neutral stimuli. The nine images on a particular trial were 
made up of three objects, three animals, and three faces, one of which was the target. This 
meant that when a target was from a particular category only two neutral fillers were 
presented from that category.   
Each stimulus frame was presented for 100ms with no inter-stimulus interval.  The 
target stimulus appeared at positions four, six, or eight in the RSVP stream an equal number 
of times, and was counterbalanced across conditions.  The peripheral distractor stimulus was 
consistently presented two slides prior to the target at Lag 2.  These peripheral distractors 
were two images presented above and below the central stimulus position. One distractor 
image was always a neutral distractor, randomly selected from the pool of neutral images. 
The other distractor stimulus could either be a threat-related distractor, positive distractor, or 
another neutral distractor. Within each condition the distractor image appeared an equal 
number of times above and below the central stream.  
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Figure 1. An example trial sequence from Experiment 1a and 1b. The first frame which appeared was 
a 400ms cue for the search goal for that block, and was either “THREATENING” or “POSITIVE”. 
This was followed by a nine frame RSVP stream, with each frame appearing for 100ms. Eight of the 
images were neutral, and one was the target which appeared at one of four locations (five, six, seven, 
or eight) in the RSVP stream, and was either a positive image (e.g. smiling children) or threat-related 
(e.g. mutilation or death). Distractors appeared above and below the RSVP stream and always two 
frames prior to the target. At the end of the trials, participants typed what they thought the positive or 
threat-related target was using the keyboard. In Experiment 2 and 3, the response was present/absent 
judgment, which participant made at the end of the trial. In the figure, the mutilation and death image 
is an illustration of an IAPS image created for the purpose of the figure. The emotional faces in the 
figure were taken from the NimStim image set with permission for publication by Tottenham and 
colleagues (2009). 
 
At the end of each trial, the participant typed out the positive or threat-related image 
they identified as the target using the keyboard and pressed the ‘Enter’ key, which triggered 
the beginning of the next trial. The dependent variable was the percentage of trials where 
participants accurately reported the correct positive or threat related objects, faces and 
animals which had been presented. In total there were four blocks of 54 trials each, with a 
period of rest every two blocks, the duration of which was determined by the participant.  The 
search condition blocks were presented in an alternating format (e.g. positive-threat-positive-
threat).  The block order was counterbalanced between participants, with half the participants 
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completing a threat search block first.  When blocks were not separated by a rest period a text 
warning was presented for 3000ms alerting the participant that the search goal had changed.  
Other than the search goal, which was manipulated between blocks, all within participant 
factors were fully counterbalanced within each block.  
 Before the main task, participants completed a six-trial practice block, which required 
them to search for house images amongst a stream of cars, shoes, bricks, and trees, and type 
out a specific feature of each house.  The specific images used in these practice trials were 
different from the set used in the main experiment.   
Scoring. In order to determine the percentage of trials which were correct, the 
participants’ responses were checked against the correct answer using an Excel formula 
which marked a trial as correct when the spelling of the response corresponded to the spelling 
of the correct answer. In order to account for spelling and approximate responses, the first 
author (C.R.H.B) coded the participants’ responses prior to the Excel formula being applied. 
C.R.H.B was blind to both the distractor conditions and the correct answers during this 
process.  
Prior to scoring, the following coding rules were applied to all responses: Incorrectly 
spelt answers were corrected to the most similar target included in the set of images.  Vague 
descriptions of objects were not allowed, despite being similar to the target if it could also 
describe another target, e.g. “sharp object” was marked incorrect when the target was a 
syringe due to it also being descriptive of the knife target. Animals judged to be subordinate 
to the potential target animal were changed to the superordinate animal (e.g. “black widow” 
was accepted for spider; “cobra” was accepted for snake).  The block context was taken into 
account, meaning that if the search condition was positive, the answer of “dog” was changed 
to “puppy”, despite dog also being accepted as an answer in the threat search block. Due to 
difficulty distinguishing the different faces apart, any description of a fearful face was 
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accepted for all three fearful face targets, i.e. “scared”, “shocked”, “fear” were all accepted. 
To remain consistent across answers, changes were made universally to all answers made by 
a single participant, meaning that once a change was made to an answer it was also made for 
all identical answers that individual participant had made.  The percentage of correctly 
identified animals was recorded as the outcome measure for analysis.   
Bayesian analysis. To supplement the main analysis, we computed Bayes factors in 
order to determine whether any null effects were due to insensitivity or a true null effect.  A 
Bayes factor compares evidence for the experimental hypothesis (goal-matching affective 
stimuli will result in greater attentional capture versus neutral stimuli) and the null hypothesis 
(goal-matching affective stimuli will not result in attentional capture versus neutral stimuli).  
The Bayes factor ranges from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate that there is support for 
the null hypothesis, whilst values of greater than 1 indicate that there is support for the 
experimental hypothesis.  The strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the 
Bayes Factor; values greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either 
the experimental or null hypothesis.  A value closer to 1 suggests that any non-significant 
result is due to insensitivity and any difference or null effect is ‘anecdotal’ (Jeffreys, 1961; 
Dienes, 2008; 2011; 2014; 2016). 
The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s 
(2010) R code (retrieved from Dienes, 2008).  To compute the factor, we used a half-normal 
distribution which estimates that smaller differences are more probable than large differences. 
This half-normal was set with a mean of zero which reflects the null hypothesis of zero 
difference. we used a half-normal distribution due to the previous evidence in the literature 
that the effect would be directional; specifically, that threat-related stimuli would capture 
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attention more than neutral stimuli 3.  The standard deviation of this distribution was set to 
8%, which reflects the plausible effect size taken from Brown et al. (in press; Experiment 1). 
This effect size was taken from the comparisons between the neutral baseline distractor and 
the threatening animal distractor condition when participants were searching for threatening 
animals. All direct comparisons between conditions were tested using Bayes factors, 
however, p-values were also computed using two-way paired samples t-tests to facilitate 
comparison to previous results. 
Results and Discussion 
For both Experiment 1a and 1b the identification accuracy for each condition was 
entered in a 2×3 repeated measures ANOVA with search goal category (threat/ positive) and 
distractor conceptual category (threat/ positive/ neutral) as the two factors (see Table 1). We 
note that the accuracy reported in both experiments was in line with that reported across the 
four experiments in Wyble et al. (2013) using an identical response format, M = 53.5%, SD = 
9.63%. The main effect of search goal category was significant for both Experiment 1a and 
1b, with targets from the threat-related affective search goal being more accurately identified 
than targets which were  part of the positive affective search goal, Experiment 1a: F(1,26) = 
21.33, p < .001, ƞ2p = .45; Experiment 1b: F(1,15) = 6.12, p = .026, ƞ
2
p = .29. There was, 
however, no significant difference between the three distractor conceptual categories in either 
experiment, Experiment 1a: F(2,52) = .646, p =  .634, ƞ2p = .02; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = 
1.09, p = .349, ƞ2p = .07. Further, against our hypothesis, we found no significant interaction 
between the current search goal and the distractor conceptual category in these two 
                                                          
3 Following Dienes (2008; 2011), an adjusted standard error was applied based on the sample 
sizes collected. This adjustment was done using the following equation:  SE*(1 + 20/df*df). 
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experiments, Experiment 1a: F(2,52) = .57, p = .568, ƞ2p = .02; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = .77, 
p = .472, ƞ2p = .05.  
Table 1. Mean and standard deviations for percentage accuracy across all distractor and search goal 









(n = 27) 
Positive search goal 53.70 (19) 53.40 (21.29) 55.76 (19.67) 
Threat search goal 69.86 (16.50) 68.72 (16.73) 69.24 (18.07) 
Experiment 1b 
(n = 16) 
Positive search goal 53.47 (15.36) 53.99 (19.67) 55.90 (18.14) 
Threat search goal 63.89 (12.55) 65.63 (12.66) 64.76 (12.49) 
In order to test the sensitivity of this null result we conducted Bayesian pairwise 
comparisons between the affective distractor and the neutral distractor in each condition for 
both experiments. This revealed that when participants were searching for the conceptual 
category of threat, both experiments found a sensitive null difference between threat-related 
and neutral distractors, Experiment 1a: t(26) = .30, p = .766, Hedges’ gz = .06, BH[0,8] = .28; 
Experiment 1b: t(15) = .60, p = .558, Hedges’ gz = -.15, BH[0, 8] = .13, thus revealing that there 
was evidence in favour of the null hypothesis: searching for threat as a broad conceptual 
category did not induce goal-driven capture by all threat-related images. There was also 
sensitive null differences between positive and neutral distractors in the threat search 
condition, Experiment 1a: t(26) = .29, p = .773, Hedges’ gz = -.06, BH[0,8] = .21; Experiment 
1b: t(15) = .64, p = .533, Hedges’ gz = .16, BH[0, 8] = .31. A parallel analysis for the positive 
search condition found that the null results for this condition did not reach the threshold for a 
sensitive null result, but nevertheless favoured the null (Bayes factors for the equivalent 
contrast ranged between .65 and .84; Hedges’ gz ranged between .15 and .32). The results 
from Experiment 1a and 1b revealed that, despite the threat-related distractors sharing the 
same affective category as the broad affective search goal, participants were no more 
distracted by these images than the neutral images.  
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Experiment 2 
In the previous experiments, the threat-related distractor was never part of the target 
set, meaning that there was no feature overlap with the search goal, only affective overlap. 
Experiments 1a and 1b provide initial evidence that involuntary attentional capture cannot be 
caused purely by affective overlap. In these experiments, participants searched for the general 
category of threat, made up of three different subcategories of threat related stimuli (i.e. 
dangerous animals, fearful faces, and dangerous objects).  
Participants did not have forewarning of the target subcategories, in order to 
encourage a broad search goal based purely on affective relevance. We cannot rule out, 
however, the possibility that participants may have become aware of the subcategories of 
threat and hence adopted a narrower goal for these three specific subcategories, rather than a 
more general goal for all threat. If participants were searching specifically for threatening 
animals, fearful faces, and threatening objects this could explain the lack of goal-driven 
capture by images of mutilation. It therefore remains possible that a broader affective search 
goal encompassing all possible categories of threat-related stimuli could potentially induce 
general goal-driven involuntary capture by threat.  
Experiment 2 therefore examined whether a broad search goal encompassing multiple 
threat-related categories could lead to involuntary capture by stimuli from one of these 
categories. To test this, we included one of the target categories – fearful and neutral faces - 
as distractor conditions, alongside the mutilation and neutral scene distractor conditions 
(which as in Experiment 1 were not part of the target set). We expected that the fearful faces 
would interfere more with the task than the neutral faces in this Experiment because of the 
overlap with the search goal. Additionally, to encourage the adoption of a broad attentional 
set for the affective category, we increased the number of target exemplars within the threat-
related target category from 9 to 24 images. We, however, expected to replicate Experiments 
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1a and 1b and find no difference between the mutilation and neutral scenes, even with this 
broader search.  
In order to conserve statistical power with multiple conditions, we dropped the 
positive search and positive distractor condition in favour of focusing purely on threat-related 
categories. Another alteration to the current task was the type of response that participants 
made to the targets. In Experiment 1a and 1b the response required relatively deep processing 
of the targets, and this may have encouraged participants to adopt an overly specific goal. In 
Experiment 2, participants now had to make a present/ absent judgment which would have a 
lower threshold to correctly respond to the target (Shang & Bishop, 2000). This response 
format has been previously used in other variants of our task to demonstrate goal-driven 
capture (e.g. Brown et al., 2018a; 2018b).   
Methods 
Participants. As in Experiment 1b, participants were recruited until all Bayes factors 
for the pairwise comparisons between neutral and the affective goal-congruent threat-related 
distractors were sensitive (i.e. B > 3 or B < .33). The Bayes factors were checked at the end 
of each day of testing. This led to 16 participants being recruited, of which 12 were female 
and 4 male. The average age of the participants was 24.31 (SD = 4.29). Participants were 
remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment. A power analysis using G*power 
software revealed that our final sample had the power of β = .80 to detect a pairwise effect of 
dz = .75 or above (α = .05; Faul et al., 2007). 
Stimuli. All stimuli were similar to Experiment 1a and 1b with the following 
exceptions. Firstly, all stimuli were now presented on a Dell 1707FP monitor with the 
resolution set to 1280 × 1024 and a refresh rate of 60Hz. Additionally, due to the 
present/absent judgement task requiring more images for the increased number of trials, 
additional images were collected for presentation in the RSVP stream. Further, all images 
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within this task were taken from existing databases, in order to exclude any possibility that 
the previous result was influenced by the inclusion of any stimuli from unestablished sets. 
These images included 136 neutral animal images, 136 neutral face images, and 136 neutral 
objects. The neutral animals were taken from a previous investigation conducted in our lab 
which had been rated along dimensions of threat, cuteness, positive, and negative and were 
not rated highly on any of these dimensions (Brown et al., in press). The neutral faces were 
sourced from the Lifespan Adult Facial Stimuli Database (Minear & Park, 2004). The neutral 
objects were taken from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1997), Nencki Affective Picture System 
(NAPS; Marchewka et al., 2014) and the Geneva Affective Picture Database (GAPED; Dan-
Glauser & Scherer, 2011). All image sets have been used in prior investigations of attention 
to emotional stimuli.  
For the threat target category, eight threatening animal stimuli, eight fearful face 
stimuli, and eight threatening objects were presented. The threatening animals were also 
taken from the previous investigation and had also been rated as moderately arousing and 
unpleasant; the different types of animal were identical to those presented in Experiments 1a 
and 1b (Brown et al., in press). The fearful faces were taken from the NimStim database 
(Tottenham et al., 2009) and included an equal balance of male and female faces, as well as a 
range of ethnicities; as with the neutral faces, these were also ovalled.  The majority of the 
threatening objects were taken from the IAPS and NAPS databases. However, to increase the 
number of threatening object targets, four images were sourced from Google images. These 
were objects which were part of the IAPS and NAPS image sets but with slightly different 
features (e.g. orange syringe instead of blue). The exact objects presented were a burning car, 
knives, syringes, and guns. 
For the distractor images, twelve neutral faces and twelve fearful faces were taken 
from the NimStim database. These shared the same identity and retained the same balance of 
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genders as Experiment 1a and 1b. The mutilation and neutral scene distractor images 
consisted of twelve neutral scenes and twelve threat-related scenes, all taken from the IAPS 
image set (Lang et al., 1997). These included those presented in Experiments 1a and 1b.  
As before, when the distractors were presented above or below the RSVP stream, the 
opposite distractor location was occupied with another image. For the face stimuli this was a 
patch of skin texture taken from a close-up of the distractor faces and contained no facial 
features. Twenty-four of these skin texture patches were presented, and included a range of 
different skin tones which were matched to the distractor faces. For the scene distractors the 
opposite distractor location was occupied with an inverted and blurred social scene sourced 
from Google images. Twenty-four of these images were created, and contained a similar 
range of colours to the neutral and threat-related scenes, but without the affective or 
conceptual content. 
All images were the same size as in Experiment 1b, with the exception of the fearful 
and neutral face distractors presented in parafoveal locations. These were resized to 
1.57°×2.29° so they were the same height as the other stimuli. In order to match the width of 
these face stimuli to the other distractor images, faces were presented on a grey rectangle 
which was the same width as the other stimuli in the same position (i.e. 3.44°×2.29°).  
Procedure. The task was similar to Experiment 1a and 1b, with the following 
exceptions. Across all trials, participants were given the same affective search goal 
instruction as in Experiments 1a and 1b, but they were also given verbal instructions that 
some of the images may be emotional faces, predatory or poisonous animals, or dangerous 
objects. It was left deliberately vague what exactly these images would be, and whether these 
were the only threat-related images presented.  
At the start of each trial participants were given a 400ms saying cue “Threat-related” 
to prompt the start of the trial. This was followed by the nine frame RSVP stream, with three 
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objects, three animals, and three faces. One of the images could be the target which could 
appear at position five, six, seven, or eight in the stream. On half the trials the threat-related 
target was present, on the other half absent. On absent trials, the target position was replaced 
by a neutral image; the replacement neutral stimulus was selected so that there were always 
three of each of the different conceptual categories (object, animal, face). All the different 
targets appeared equally in each experimental condition, and all other within-subject’s 
variables were counterbalanced.  At the end of the RSVP stream, a screen with a “?” 
appeared, with participants then indicating whether they believed a threat related image had 
been presented on that trial, using the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys, with the response-answer association 
counterbalanced between participants. In total there were three blocks of 64 trials. At the start 
of the task, participants completed an eight-trial practice block which used the same stimuli 
as the practice block in Experiment 1a and 1b. 
Results and Discussion 
Unlike Experiment 1a and 1b, A-prime (A’) detection sensitivity index was the 
dependent variable (see Table 2), rather than accuracy, due to the use of the present/absent 
response rather than identification response. A’ is a non-parametric analogue of d’, computed 
using hit rate and false alarm rate from the present/absent task response (Stanislaw & 
Todoroff, 1999; Zhang & Mueller 2005). A′ ranges from .5, which indicates that a signal 
cannot be distinguished from noise, to 1, which corresponds to perfect performance. This 
measure removes potential response bias which can influence binary response measures such 
as the present/absent judgment.  
A 2×2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using A’ as the dependent variable, 
and distractor conceptual category (face/ scene) and distractor affect (neutral/ threat-related) 
as the within-participants factors. This revealed that there was no significant difference 
between the two distractor conceptual categories, F(1,15) < .01, p = .980, ƞ2p < .01. Further, 
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there was no difference between the detection sensitivity on trials when the distractor was 
threat-related compared to when it was neutral, F(1,15) = .46, p = .456, ƞ2p = .04. 
Additionally, against our original hypothesis, there was no interaction between the distractor 
conceptual category and distractor emotion, F(1,15) = .08, p = .785, ƞ2p = .01.  
Table 2. Mean and standard deviations for A’ detection sensitivity across all distractor and search 












(n = 16) 
Threat search  .75 (.07) .75 (.08) .74 (.07) .76 (.08) 
Experiment 3 
(n = 24) 
Fear face search .79 (.08) .83 (.03) .85 (.03) .84 (.03) 
Mutilation search .82 (.05) .83 (.02) .78 (.08) .84 (.02) 
To determine whether the null finding between the threat-related and neutral 
distractors was sensitive, we conducted Bayesian pairwise comparisons. The prior in this case 
was A’ = .10, which was the largest A’ raw effect size taken from a similar task using fearful 
faces as a search goal (Brown et al., in press). This revealed that, as in Experiment 1a and 1b, 
there was no difference between the detection sensitivity of threat-related scenes relative to 
neutral scenes, t(15) = .59, p = .567, Hedges’ gz = .14, BH[0, .10] = .34.
4 Further, the Bayes 
factors revealed that there was no difference between the fearful faces and the neutral faces, 
                                                          
4 For convenience, the stopping rule was checked using Zoltan Dienes online calculator 
(Dienes, 2008) which produced a Bayes factor of .33 for the fearful face distractor versus the 
neutral face distractor in the threat-related scene search. The subsequent analyses were 
computed using an R code version of Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) calculator, and produced a 
Bayes factor of .338, and was thus rounded up to .34, hence the difference with this Bayes 
factor and the stopping rule of .33 and below. 
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t(15) = .73, p = .479, Hedges’ gz = .18, BH[0, .10] = .17. These null results are particularly 
striking given that the fearful faces were part of the target search category.  
The intentions of Experiments 1 and 2 were to provide a test of whether a broad 
search goal for an affective category could induce involuntary attentional capture by 
congruent threat-related distractors. Despite assessing the evidence for goal-induced 
attentional capture across multiple threat-related categories, distractor dimensions, response 
types, and even when these images were congruent with one of the subordinate target 
categories of threat, the results were consistent in failing to detect any generalisation of goal-
driven capture by threat-related distractors. 
Experiment 3 
The lack of evidence for any goal-driven attentional capture by threat-related stimuli, 
even when they were part of the attentional set, strikingly contrasts with our previous 
findings using a similar paradigm (Brown et al., in press; 2018a; 2018b). Within these 
previous investigations, we found that searching for a single conceptual category of affective 
stimuli (i.e. a category based on shared properties above and beyond the affective properties, 
e.g. ‘threatening animals’) consistently resulted in strong attentional capture by other 
affective stimuli from the same category, even when they appeared in task-irrelevant 
locations. This could suggest that goal-driven attentional capture cannot generalise across 
semantically heterogeneous categories based on shared affective properties alone. However, 
it was important to confirm that the distractor stimuli used in the present study are capable of 
eliciting robust goal-driven capture effects when the search goals are restricted to a single 
sub-category of affective stimuli. To this end, we conducted a final experiment in which 
participants were given search goals for each of the two distractor subcategories (fearful faces 
and the mutilation scenes) in separate blocks. We predicted that these threat-related 
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categories would only capture attention, relative to the neutral stimuli, when participants were 
searching for that specific category of threat in the central RSVP stream. 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were recruited until all Bayes factors for the pairwise 
comparisons between neutral and threat-related distractors were sensitive, across all distractor 
categories in both search goal conditions. The Bayes factors were checked at the end of each 
day of testing. This led to 24 participants being recruited, of which 18 were female and 6 
were male, the average age of which was 23.50 (SD = 3.49). Participants were remunerated 
with course credits or a small cash payment.  A power analysis using G*power software 
revealed that our final sample had the power of β = .80 to detect a pairwise effect of dz = .60 
or above (α = .05; Faul et al., 2007). 
Stimuli and procedure. The task was identical to Experiment 2 with the exception of 
the following changes. In order to experimentally manipulate the specificity of search goal, 
participants were instructed to search for fearful faces or scenes of mutilation and death in 
different blocks. In total there were six blocks which were made up of 64 trials, with three 
blocks where participants searched for “Fearful faces” and three where they searched for 
“Injury and death”. These blocks were presented in a mixed order (i.e. Fear – Mutilation – 
Fear – Mutilation – Fear - Mutilation) with the order counterbalanced between participants. 
Before each block, participants were instructed what the upcoming target category would be, 
requiring them to press the space bar to continue to the next block. Additionally, before each 
trial began participants would be prompted with a 400ms text warning for the category, either 
“Fearful faces” or “Injury and death”. The face target set consisted of 12 faces, meaning that 
in addition to the eight faces used in Experiment 2, four additional fearful face targets were 
added from the NimStim and Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES; Van Der 
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Schalk, Hawk, Fischer & Doosje, 2011). The stimulus set for scenes of mutilation and death 
consisted of 12 images that were taken from the IAPS and the GAPED stimulus sets.  
Additionally, due to the inclusion of mutilation scenes in the central stream we 
replaced the neutral animal filler images with neutral human scene filler images, thus 
matching the experiments for the semantic relations between the filler and the target 
categories. These neutral scene images consisted of 140 images, sourced from the IAPS and 
NAPS image sets, or from Google images. Eighty images sourced from Google were selected 
based on their similarity to the images from the IAPS and NAPS; they included scenes of 
people shopping, on public transport, or at work. The neutral objects consisted of 128 neutral 
objects, which were the same as in Experiment 2, though 8 were removed. The neutral faces 
consisted of 140 faces, with four male and four female faces from the lifespan database added 
to those used in Experiment 2 (Minear & Park, 2004). The stimuli presented in distractor 
locations were identical to those presented in the previous experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
We conducted a 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA on the A’ score (see Table 2), 
using search goal (fearful faces/ death and injury), distractor conceptual category (faces/ 
scenes), and distractor valence (neutral/ threat-related) as factors. This revealed that there was 
a significant effect of search goal, F(1,23) = 5.66, p = .026, ƞ2p = .20, with participants more 
accurately detecting the fearful faces than the scenes of death and injury. There was also a 
marginally significant effect of distractor conceptual category, F(1,23) = 3.32, p = .081, ƞ2p = 
.13, whereby face distractors resulted in lower detection sensitivity relative to the scene 
distractors.  
The category of distractor did not significantly interact with the valence of the 
distractor, F(1,23) = .01, p = .956, ƞ2p < .01. However, the current search goal of the 
participant did significantly interact with the category of distractor presented, F(1,23) = 
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10.48, p = .001, ƞ2p = .37, with both scenes and face distractors resulting in lower detection 
sensitivity when congruent with the current search goal, relative to when they were 
incongruent. Current search goal also marginally interacted with the valence of the 
distractors, F(1,23) = 4.10, p = .055, ƞ2p = .15, such that when participants were searching for 
scenes of injury and death, participants were worse at detecting the target when the distractor 
was threat related relative to neutral. Importantly, both of these interactions were driven by a 
significant three-way interaction between current search goal, distractor conceptual category, 
and distractor threat-relevance, F(1,23) = 15.71, p = .001, ƞ2p = .41.  As can be seen in Figure 
2, this interaction reflected interference from the threat-related (versus neutral) distractors 
only when these matched the current threat-related category being searched for.   
Figure 2. Mean threat-related distractor effect as a function of distractor category and search goal. 
The threat-related distractor effect reflects the decrease in target detection sensitivity (A’) in the 
presence of a threat-related distractor versus a matched neutral distractor. Larger distractor effects 
depict a greater decrement in target detection sensitivity. Error bars reflect within-subjects standard 
error. 
In order to break down the three-way interaction, we conducted four Bayesian 
pairwise comparisons between A’ when the distractor was threat-related compared to its 
matched neutral counterpart, within each search goal condition. This revealed that when 
participants were searching for the threat-related scenes, the detection sensitivity did not 
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differ between fearful face distractors and the neutral face distractor, t(23) = 1.25, p = .224, 
Hedges’ gz = .25, BH[0, .10] = .33. Additionally, the threat-related scene did not differ from 
neutral scenes in their influence on detection sensitivity of the fearful faces, t(23) = .88, p = 
.386, Hedges’ gz = -.18, BH[0, .10] = .04. Therefore, when incongruent with the current search 
goal, there was no evidence of attentional capture by threat-related distractors. When, 
however, the distractors were congruent with the current search goal, the threat-related 
distractors produced a significant decrement in detection sensitivity relative to their neutral 
counterpart – reflecting goal-driven attentional capture. This was true for both faces and the 
mutilation scenes, t(23) = 3.36, p = .003, Hedges’ gz = .68, BH[0, .10] = 46.13; t(23) = 3.85, p = 
.001, Hedges’ gz = .78, BH[0, .10] = 265.91, respectively.  
Internal Meta-analysis 
As well as analysing each experiment individually, we also chose to meta-analytically 
compute the overall threat distractor effect size across experiments depending on the breadth 
of the search goal.  We initially conducted a moderation analysis comparing the cumulative 
Hedges’ gz standardised effects of the threat distractor (i.e. neutral minus threat distractor 
accuracy) when participants were searching for a broad category of threat consisting of 
multiple subcategories (k = 4), compared to conditions where participants were searching for 
a specific category of threat and the distractors were also from the same specific category (k = 
2). The full details of this analysis are reported in supplementary materials 2.   
The moderation analysis revealed that across experiments there was a significantly 
larger distractor effect when participants held a search goal for a specific category of threat 
compared to a broad affective category, Hedges’ gz = .64, p = .001, 95% CI[.26, 1.02]. To 
follow-up this difference, we computed two fixed effects meta-analyses within each search 
goal condition (broad/specific; see Figure 3). These revealed that there was a near zero and 
non-significant decrement in accuracy incurred by threat distractors in the broad search 
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condition, Hedges’ gz = .07, p = .599, 95% CI[-.15, .28]. The Bayes factors revealed strong 
evidence favouring the null hypothesis with both the effect size predicted at the start of the 
investigation, BH[0, 8] = .13, as well as a reduced prior effect size which should be sensitive to 
even small effects, BH[0, 4] = .26.  
When, however, we focused on the two conditions in Experiment 3, where the 
distractor matched the single subcategory of threat being searched for, there was a large 
significant effect, Hedges’ gz = .71, p < .001, 95% CI[.39, 1.02], and strong evidence 
favouring the experimental hypothesis, BH[0,8] = 425249.40. The cumulative evidence 
therefore matched the evidence at the individual experiment level: There was evidence 
against goal-driven attentional capture when participants held a broad search goal for 
multiple threat-related stimuli, but strong evidence of goal-driven attentional capture within a 
single affective-conceptual category.  
Figure 3. Forest plot presenting the Hedges’ gz standardised effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals 
from across all conditions where the distractor was threat-related. Fixed effects cumulative effect 
sizes are presented as diamonds. These were computed based on whether the current search goal for 
threat was broad (top diamond) or specific (bottom diamond). 
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General Discussion 
Across our first three experiments, we consistently found that asking participants to 
adopt a broad attentional set for threat did not induce attentional capture by threat-related 
distractors (fearful faces and threat-related scenes), despite the clear affective overlap 
between goal and distractor. No goal-driven capture was observed even when a third of the 
targets which made up this search goal were drawn from the same sub-category as the 
distractors; that is, when participants searched for fearful faces, threatening objects, and 
threatening animals, fearful faces did not capture attention. However, these same affective 
distractors produced clear attentional capture effects when participants searched for the same 
single sub-category of threat-related stimuli.  
The absence of goal-driven capture across the general category of ‘threat’, defined 
purely by common affective properties among category items, appears to contrast with 
previous demonstrations of robust goal-driven capture by conceptual categories (Wyble et al., 
2013; Brown et al., 2018a; 2018b; in press; Wu, Pruitt, Zinszer & Cheung, 2017; Nako, Wu, 
Smith & Eimer, 2014). However, in previous examples of goal-driven capture by conceptual 
categories, the category was defined by semantic and functional relations between items 
rather than just affective associations (e.g. dangerous objects also have the common semantic 
property of being ‘objects’). Indeed, in Experiment 3 when participants searched for single 
conceptual categories of threat, which held common semantic as well as affective properties 
(e.g. ‘fearful faces’), we found reliable goal-driven capture. This implies a distinction in the 
relation of goal-driven attention to categories defined by non-affective (e.g. perceptual or 
semantic) versus purely affective properties – while the former can induce goal-driven 
capture, the latter cannot. One might speculate that this reflects differences in the ability of 
affective information, versus perceptual or semantic information, to influence goal-driven 
attention. 
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An alternative possibility, however, could lie in suggestions that involuntary capture 
can only result from prioritisation of a single perceptual feature (e.g. colour or shape; van 
Mooreselaar, Theeuwes & Olivers, 2014), or only for multiple features related to a single 
object file (e.g. Berggren & Eimer, 2018). It might be argued that affective categories are, 
therefore, too perceptually heterogeneous to induce goal-driven attentional capture. By this 
account, previous demonstrations of goal-driven capture by conceptual categories are argued 
to reflect individuals tuning attention towards a limited set of features which were typical of a 
category (Evans & Treisman, 2005). In support of a key role of perceptual features in 
category search, Yu, Maxfield and Zelinsky (2016) determined the prevalence of category-
consistent features across stimuli using computational techniques, and found that participants 
were faster to detect a target from a category if it contained more of these consistent features.  
Further, participants are faster to detect targets from categories with a lot of similar features 
compared to those that are more varied (Hout, Robbins, Godwin, Fitzsimmons & Scarince, 
2017).  
Such an account would also explain why, when participants were searching for a 
single category of threat in Experiment 3, another category of threat did not capture attention. 
This initially appears to contradict previous research which has revealed that when 
individuals are searching for a single exemplar from a category, other exemplars from the 
same category capture attention despite not being the specific target. For instance, research 
has found that searching for a single item of clothing (e.g. jeans) resulted in capture by other 
clothes (e.g. t-shirts; Nako et al., 2014) and searching for one type of animal (e.g. a fish) led 
to capture by another animal (e.g. a bird; Telling, Kumar, Meyer & Humphreys, 2010). 
When, however, participants were searching for either fearful faces or mutilation, the other 
category did not capture attention, despite being threat related. If, however, previous 
generalisation effects were due to attentional capture by common features across exemplars 
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within a category, then the previous instances of conceptual attentional capture could simply 
be due to visual overlap between stimuli. For instance, in Telling and colleagues’ experiment, 
birds and fish were the only stimuli to have facial features, and in Nako and colleagues’ work 
the t-shirts and jeans were the only stimuli to have stitching and creases. Fearful faces and 
mutilation images may be visually distinct enough that the participants could search for one 
without inducing capture by the other threat category. 
On the other hand, the suggestion that goal-driven capture can be induced only by 
perceptual features is challenged by Giammarco and colleagues’ (2016) finding of goal-
driven capture by a heterogeneous artificial category. In this case, participants were trained 
on an artificial category learning task until they could report each object’s category at 90% 
accuracy. The participants then searched for these heterogeneous categories in an RSVP task. 
It was found that a task-irrelevant distractor only interfered with target detection if it was 
from the same artificial category as the current search goal, even though these categories had 
only been learnt in the same session. It might be argued, however, that the extensive training 
enabled participants to learn common features within the category - thus a specific feature-
based account cannot be fully discounted. Further, there is the possibility that conceptual 
categories with more complex relationships beyond simple group membership are searched 
for differently from artificially grouped objects (Wu & Zhao, 2017). Future research is 
required to delineate the role of experience and the depth of relationship between the category 
exemplars in categorical attentional search tasks.  
Regardless of the specific mechanism involved, the present work highlights an 
important boundary condition for goal-driven attention that informs theoretical understanding 
of attentional capture by affective stimuli. A growing body of research has pointed to a goal-
driven account of attentional capture by affective stimuli, highlighting that this capture often 
depends on task-relevance rather than occurring unconditionally (e.g. Vromen et al., 2016; 
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Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012; Stein et al., 2009). Our current results clearly demonstrate 
that relevance to an affective top-down attentional goal is not wholly sufficient to induce 
goal-driven attentional capture; if this were the case then participants should have been 
distracted by all threat-related stimuli when adopting a search goal for this category. Instead, 
the results suggest that goal-driven capture by irrelevant threat-related stimuli may only occur 
when that specific conceptual category of threat-related stimuli (e.g. fearful faces or 
mutilation scenes) is adopted as an attentional goal.  
Indeed, we propose that in order for involuntary attentional capture to emerge there 
has to be the intention to search for that specific stimulus category, as well as knowledge of 
which specific features define that category, not just the relevance of the affective distractor 
to the current task aims. In light of the present findings, it appears possible that previous 
demonstrations of relevance effects could be explained by relevance cueing participants to 
adopt a top-down search goal for the specific conceptual category of threat-related stimuli. 
For example, in Lichtenstein-Vidne and colleagues’ (2012) study, participants may have 
noticed that the targets were often threat-related scenes and adopted a more specific 
attentional goal for these scenes because of their motivational relevance, even though this 
strategy was not necessary to complete the task. 
We note that while we did not observe involuntary goal-driven effects across affective 
categories, participants nevertheless appeared capable of using these categories to direct 
voluntary goal-driven attention (i.e. they could detect or identify different stimuli from across 
this visually heterogeneous affective category). An item level analysis revealed that each 
participant correctly reported the majority of the threat-related target exemplars at least once 
across the experiment (Expt 1a M = 93%; Expt 1b M = 90%; Expt 2 M = 94%). The data 
therefore suggest that participants perceived stimuli drawn from multiple semantic categories 
(e.g. faces, animals, objects) as matching the search goal, meaning that, at some level, 
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participants were able to hold multiple/broad threat-related categories active as a search goal 
without inducing involuntary attentional capture.  
In this respect, our results are intriguing in suggesting that the criteria for a stimulus 
category to guide voluntary attention are not the same as those which produces involuntary 
goal-driven effects. Our results could perhaps be accommodated within models of hybrid 
visual search (e.g. Cunningham & Wolfe, 2014; Wolfe, 2012), which propose that when 
individuals only have to search for a limited set of visual features to complete a task, these 
features are prioritised as a search template. When, however, individuals are required to 
search for multiple visually distinct targets they adopt a different strategy relying on analysing 
objects at a post-selective level. Hybrid visual search theory has not yet been explored in the 
context of involuntary goal-driven capture; however, one might speculate that involuntary 
effects occur only in contexts where templates for clearly defined stimulus features can be 
adopted, and not in contexts where the later strategy is called upon. 
The current experiments were designed to investigate a within-participants 
experimental question, rather than individual differences in attentional capture. However, the 
specificity of goal-driven attentional capture seen in the present investigation results appears 
to parallel patterns seen in recent anxiety disorder research. A recent meta-analysis revealed 
that across a range of anxiety disorders (e.g. phobias, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, social 
anxiety), specific sub-categories of threat-related stimuli which were particularly relevant to 
that disorder (e.g. angry faces in social anxiety) captured attention more than other threat-
related stimuli (Pergamin-Hight, Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijsendoorn & Bar-Haim, 
2015). These rather specific clinical attentional biases, along with the present evidence, are 
consistent with the notion that individuals assume search goals only for the specific threat-
related stimuli which are relevant to their current concerns. 
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An interesting question is how such a specific goal-driven form of attentional capture 
could work in a real-world setting, where participants would be unlikely to search for a 
specific threat across all situations at the cost of all other search goals. Here, we propose that 
participants may use prior knowledge and learned associations between a context and the 
objects that may appear there, in order to determine what specific category to search for. A 
range of different threat-related stimuli might be deemed important at one time, but 
contextual cues would allow prioritisation of specific categories of threat which are more 
likely to appear in a specific moment. For example, a dark inner-city alleyway would be more 
likely to cue a goal for potential muggers than poisonous snakes, while a hike in Joshua Tree 
National Park might do the opposite.   
Within the current investigation, we explored how a search goal for threat could 
induce attentional capture, without the need to induce an internal state or select for 
personality differences that have previously been required to elicit attentional capture by 
threat (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It is highly likely, however, that many real-world contexts 
in which an individual would be expecting and searching for threat would also be highly 
arousing. To fully understand the real-world operation of goal-driven attention, future work 
should therefore explore potential interactions between current arousal or anxiety with 
affective search goals.  
In conclusion, we found no evidence that involuntary attentional capture by threat-
related stimuli can be induced by a broad affective search goal, despite the same stimuli 
eliciting robust goal-driven capture when a more specific affective search goal was adopted. 
This finding highlights an important boundary condition for goal-driven attentional capture, 
which must be considered in any goal-driven account of attentional capture by affective 
stimuli.   
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Open Practices Statement 
 All tasks, unlicensed images sourced or created for this investigation, as well as data 
and analysis scripts are available via the Open Science Framework: osf.io/ju87s. 
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